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s to the players are determined by an allocation rule on the
underlying game and the coalition structure that results from the strategies of
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we study the formation of coalition structures in case the underlying eco-
nomic possibilities of the players are represented by a cooperative game. The process of
coalition formation and payo division will be modeled by means of a game in strate-
gic form, which can be seen as a two-stage game. In the rst stage, players reveal their
preferred coalition and some coalition formation rule then determines the coalition struc-
ture. In the second stage, the payos to the players are determined by an exogenously
given allocation rule for cooperative games with coalition structures.
We study two descriptions of the rst stage, one reﬂects a stringent coalition formation
rule and the other a less stringent rule. Both assume that each player chooses a coalition
he wants to join. According to the stringent formation rule, two players end up in the
same coalition if they choose the same coalition and all players in their preferred coalition
also choose this coalition, whereas the less stringent formation rule only requires that
they choose the same coalition.
The second stage, the stage of payo division, is modeled by means of an exogenous
allocation rule for cooperative games with a xed coalition structure. The payos to
the players are determined by applying the allocation rule to the underlying cooperative
game and the coalition structure that was formed in the rst stage. Aumann and Dr eze
(1974) study such allocation rules, mainly extensions of well-known allocation rules for
cooperative games to the setting of cooperative games with a coalition structure. They
impose component eciency, which states that each element in a coalition structure
should divide the total payos accruing to this coalition among its members. We will
impose component eciency as well.
These two-stage models of coalition formation might result in multiple equilibria. In
this paper we will not interfere in the discussion on equilibrium selection. Rather, we
study coalition formation models that are potential games (cf. Monderer and Shapley
(1996)). Potential games are games in strategic form with a natural and generally
accepted equilibrium renement, the potential maximizer.
The goal of this paper is two-fold. First, for the two specications of the coalition
formation rule described above, we study which component ecient allocation rules
result in the coalition formation game being a potential game. Secondly, if the coalition
formation rule and the allocation rule are such that the coalition formation game is a
potential game, we study which coalition structures result according to the potential
maximizer.
We will show that if we adopt the stringent formation rule in the rst stage and we3
impose component eciency on the allocation rule in the second stage, then there is a
unique allocation rule that results in a potential game. This allocation rule divides for
each element of the coalition structure the gains over stand-alone values equally among
the players in this coalition.
If we adopt the less stringent coalition formation rule rather than the stringent one
and impose component eciency on the allocation rule in the second stage, then we also
nd that there is a unique allocation rule that results in a potential game. This allocation
rule is the extension of the Shapley value to cooperative games with coalition structures
as suggested by Aumann and Dr eze (1974). Moreover, we show that with this allocation
rule, if the underlying game is superadditive then the strategy prole resulting in the
grand coalition is a potential maximizing strategy prole, and all potential maximizing
strategy proles result in the same payos.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) already present a non-cooperative two-stage
game of coalition formation in (superadditive) cooperative games. The rst stage is
described by the stringent formation rule. Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) assume
that if a coalition is formed, in the second stage it equally divides the value of this
coalition among its members.
An innovative approach to coalition structure formation is presented in Hart and
Kurz (1983). In contrast with the models described so far, Hart and Kurz (1983) assume
that coalitions only form for the sake of bargaining over the division of the value of the
grand coalition. For a specic coalition structure they employ the Shapley value in two
negotiation stages, rst between coalitions, and then within coalitions. The resulting
allocation rule is called the coalitional Shapley value and coincides with the value for
games with a priori unions of Owen (1977). Hart and Kurz (1983) then analyze a two-
stage model of coalition formation. They study two descriptions of the rst stage, the
stringent coalition formation rule and the less stringent rule. In the second stage, the
players receive the coalitional Shapley value of the underlying game with the coalition
structure of the rst stage.
Meca-Martinez et al. (1998) also study a two-stage model of coalition structure for-
mation. The rst stage of their model is described by the stringent coalition formation
rule. Unlike Hart and Kurz (1983), Meca-Martinez et al. (1998) do not x an allocation
rule for the second stage a priori. Rather, they study conditions on the allocation rule
to ensure that if the underlying game is convex, then the grand coalition results from
a strong Nash equilibrium of the corresponding game in strategic form. In this paper
we show that the results shown by Meca-Martinez et al. (1998) also hold for the less4
stringent formation rule.
In the last few years several papers have studied two-stage cooperation structure
formation models and their relation to non-cooperative potential games. Monderer and
Shapley (1996) study a participation game. Players choose whether or not to participate
in some underlying cooperative game. Subsequently, a non-participating player receives
some stand-alone value, whereas a participating player receives a payo according to an
allocation rule applied on the subgame of participating players. Monderer and Shapley
(1996) restrict themselves to allocation rules that divide the value of the coalition of
participating players among these players. They show that if such an allocation rule
results in a potential game, then this allocation rule coincides with the Shapley value.
Related cooperation structure formation models are studied by Qin (1996) and Slikker
et al. (1999). Qin (1996) studies a model describing the formation of bilateral inter-
action links, introduced by Myerson (1991). Qin (1996) shows that under an eciency
requirement there is only one allocation rule that results in a potential game and that is
the Myerson value (cf. Myerson (1977)). Furthermore, it is shown that if the underlying
game is superadditive, then the strategy prole that results in the full cooperation struc-
ture is a potential maximizing strategy prole, and every potential maximizing strategy
prole results in the same payos as the full cooperation structure. Slikker et al. (1999)
nd similar results for the formation of conferences, where conferences are subsets of
players, representing the possibilities of direct negotiations between the players.
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 contains preliminaries and a char-
acterization of the extension of the Shapley value to cooperative games with coalition
structures as introduced by Aumann and Dr eze (1974). In section 3 we describe the
model of coalition structure formation and two coalition formation rules. We show that
the results of Meca-Martinez et al. (1998) also hold if the less stringent coalition forma-
tion rule is employed rather than the the stringent coalition formation rule. In section
4 we show that for both descriptions of the rst stage it holds that under a feasibility
requirement there is only one allocation rule that results in a potential game: the value
of Aumann and Dr eze (1974) for the less stringent formation rule and an allocation rule
that coincides with the equal division rule of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) on
the class of zero-normalized games for the stringent formation rule. In section 5 we show
that if the less stringent formation rule and the value of Aumann and Dr eze (1974) are
employed, then the strategy prole resulting in the grand coalition maximizes the po-
tential and that every strategy prole that maximizes the potential, results in the same
payos as are obtained if the grand coalition is formed. We conclude in section 6.5
2 Preliminaries
A cooperative game is a pair (N;v), where N = f1;:::;ngdenotes the set of players and
v :2 N!I R the characteristic function, with v(;) = 0. If no confusion can arise we some-
times identify a game with its characteristic function. The set of all cooperative games
with player set N is denoted by TUN. A cooperative game (N;v)i szero-normalized if
for all i 2 N it holds that v(fig) = 0. A cooperative game (N;v)i ssuperadditive if for
all T1  N and all T2  NnT1 it holds that1
v(T1 [ T2)  v(T1)+v( T 2) :
Hence, a game is superadditive if the value of the union of two disjoint coalitions (weakly)
exceeds the sum of the values of these coalitions. A cooperative game (N;v)i sconvex if
for all i 2 N and all T1  T2  N with i 2 T1 it holds that
v(T1) − v(T1nfig)  v(T2) − v(T2nfig):
So, a game is convex if the marginal contribution of a player to a coalition is (weakly)
less than his marginal contribution to a superset of that coalition.
The subgame (S;vjS) corresponding to a game (N;v)w i t hSNis determined by
vjS(T)=v ( T) for all T  S.T h eunanimity game (N;uR) is the game with uR(S)=1i f
RSand uR(S) = 0 otherwise (see Shapley (1953)). Every game (N;v) can be written
as a unique linear combination of unanimity games, i.e., v =
P
RN R(v)uR.I n c a s e
there is no ambiguity about the underlying game we simply write R instead of R(v).
The Shapley value  of a game (cf. Shapley (1953)) is now easily described by
i(N;v)=
X
R  N; i2R
R
jRj
for all i 2 N:
The Shapley value is the unique allocation rule that satises eciency, i.e.,
P
i2N i(N;v)=v ( N), and balanced contributions, i.e., i(N;v)−i(Nnfjg;v jNnfjg)=
 j( N;v)−j(Nnfig;v jNnfig) for all i;j 2 N with i 6= j (see Myerson (1980)).
Ap l a y e ri2Nis a dummy player in the game (N;v)i fv ( T[f i g )=v ( T)+v( fig)
for all T  Nnfig.
A game with a coalition structure is a triple (N;v;B), where (N;v) is a cooperative
game and B a partition of N. The set of all partitions of N is denoted by N.F o r
notational convenience we denote for all B = fB1;:::;B mg2 N,a l lk2f 1 ;:::;mg,
and all i 2 Bk:
B−i=f B 1;:::;B k−1;B knfig;fig;B k+1;:::;B mg:
1T N denotes that T is a subset of N, T  N denotes that T is a strict subset of N.6
An allocation rule γ for cooperative games with coalition structures is a function that
assigns to every triple (N;v;B) a vector γ(N;v;B) 2 IR
N . In case there is no ambiguity
on the underlying game, we will simply write γ(B) instead of γ(N;v;B). Aumann and
Dr eze (1974) studied cooperative games with coalition structures and allocation rules for
these situations. Among other things they studied the allocation rule AD that attributes
to player i 2 Bk 2Bthe Shapley value  for player i of the game restricted to partition
element Bk, i.e., AD
i (N;v;B)= ( B k ;v jB k). We will refer to AD as the value of
Aumann and Dr eze. We characterize the value of Aumann and Dr eze by two properties,
component eciency and component restricted balanced contributions. Consider these
properties for an allocation rule γ:
Component Eciency (CE) For every cooperative game (N;v) and every partition
B = fB1;:::;B mgof N it holds for all k 2f 1 ;:::;mgthat
X
i2Bk
γi(N;v;B)=v( B k) :
Component Restricted Balanced Contributions (CRBC) For every cooperative
game (N;v), every partition B = fB1;:::;B mgof N ,e v e r yk2f 1 ;:::;mg,a n d
all i;j 2 Bk it holds that
γi(N;v;B)−γi(N;v;B−j)=γ j( N;v;B)−γj(N;v;B−i ) :
Theorem 2.1 The value of Aumann and Dr eze (1974) is the unique allocation rule for
cooperative games with coalition structures satisfying (CE) and (CRBC).
Proof: The Shapley value satises eciency and balanced contributions. Since the
value of Aumann and Dr eze for the players in a partition element coincides with the
Shapley value of the game restricted to the players of this element it follows by eciency
and balanced contributions of the Shapley value that the value of Aumann and Dr eze
satises component eciency and component restricted balanced contributions.
Let γ be an allocation rule that satises component eciencyand component restrict-
ed balanced contributions. Let (N;v) be a cooperative game. We will show that
γi(N;v;B)=
AD
i (N;v;B); for all B2
N;all B 2B ; and all i 2 B:
The proof will be by induction to jBj. Obviously, for all B2 N,a l lB2Bwith
jBj = 1 it follows by component eciency that
γi(N;v;B)=v ( f i g )=
AD
i (N;v;B):7
Let p 2 IN, p  2. Assume that it holds for all B2 N,a l lB2Bwith jBjp−1, and
all i 2 B that γi(N;v;B)= AD
i (N;v;B). We will prove that γi(N;v;B)= AD
i (N;v;B)
for all B2 N,a l lB2Bwith jBj = p,a n da l li2B .
Let B2 N and B 2Bsuch that jBj = p.L e ti2B , then for all j 2 Bnfig it holds
that
γj(N;v;B)−γi(N;v;B)=γ j ( N;v;B−i )−γ i( N;v;B−j)
= AD







where the rst and third equality follow by component restricted balanced contributions
of γ and AD respectively. The second equality follows by the induction hypothesis. So,
for all j 2 Bnfig:
γj(N;v;B)−AD















Component eciency of γ and AD then implies that γi(N;v;B)= AD
i (N;v;B).
This completes the proof.
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Potential games associated with cooperative games, were introduced by Hart and
Mas-Colell (1989). They dene a potential P as a map on the set of all cooperative
games. Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) remark that for a specic TU-game (N;v)o n ec a n
view PHM
(N;v)(S)=P( S;vjS) as a TU-game as well (see remark 2.8 of Hart and Mas-Colell





jRj uR. If there is no ambiguity
about the underlying game we will simply write PHM instead of PHM
(N;v).N o t e t h a t a
cooperative game completely determines its associated potential game and vice versa.
For convenience we will sometimes refer to an associated potential game without speci-
fying the underlying cooperative game. Finally, to avoid confusion with non-cooperative
potential games, we will refer to potential games associated with cooperative games as
HM-potential games.
A game in strategic form will be denoted by Γ = (N;(X i) i2N;( i) i2N), where N =
f1;:::;ngdenotes the player set, Xi the strategy space of player i 2 N,a n d=(  i) i 2 N
the payo function which assigns to every strategy-tuple x =( x i) i 2 N2
Q
i 2 NX i=Xa8
vector in I R
N. For notational convenience we write x−i =( x l) l 2 Nnfig, x−ij =( x l) l 2 Nnfi;jg,
and xR =( x l) l 2 R.
Monderer and Shapley (1996) formally dened the class of non-cooperative potential
games. A function P :
Q
i2N Xi ! I R is called a potential for Γ if for every i 2 N,e v e r y
x2X , and every ti 2 Xi it holds that
i(xi;x −i)− i(t i;x −i)=P( x i;x −i)−P(t i;x −i): (2)
The game Γ is called a potential game if it admits a potential.
The following set of collections of cooperative games forms the basis for a represen-









This representation theorem (cf. Ui (1996)) describes a relation between non-cooperative
potential games and Shapley values of cooperative games.
Theorem 2.2 Let Γ = (N;(X i) i2N;( i) i2N) be a game in strategic form. Γ is a potential
game if and only if there exists f(N;vx)gx2X 2G N;X such that
i(x)= i( v x) for all i 2 N and all x 2 X: (4)
Proof: See Ui (1996).
2
3 A model of coalition formation
In this section we will describe two models of coalition formation. We describe the model
of coalition formation of Meca-Martinez et al. (1998) and a slight modication of this
model. We will argue that this modication does not aect their results.
Both models of coalition formation we analyze in this section can be seen as two-
stage models. We assume that a cooperative game (N;v) is exogenously given. In the
rst stage, each player announces the coalition he wants to join. Depending on the
announcements of the players a coalition structure results. In the second stage, players
negotiate over the division of the surplus, given the coalition structure of the rst stage.
This stage is modeled by means of an allocation rule.9
Firstly, we will describe the model of coalition formation that is a slight modication
of the model of coalition formation of Meca-Martinez et al. (1998). Formally, this model
of coalition formation is given by Γ(N;v;γ)=( N;(X i) i2N;(f
γ
i ) i2N)w h e r ef o ra l li2N
X i=f TNji2Tg
represents the strategy space of player i. A strategy of a player is interpreted as the
partition element this player wants to be in. A strategy prole x =( x 1;:::;x n) induces
a cooperation structure B(x)=f B 1 ;:::;B mg where players i and j are in the same
partition element if and only if xi = xj, i.e., if they prefer the same partition element.
Note that this condition can only be satised if i 2 xj and j 2 xi. The payo function
fγ =( f
γ




In case there is no ambiguity on the underlying game we will simply write Γ(γ)i n s t e a d
of Γ(N;v;γ). For notational convenience we dene for all T  N and all xT 2
Q
i2T Xi,
B(xT) as the partition of T where players i and j are in the same partition element if
and only if xi = xj.
Meca-Martinez et al. (1998) model the formation of a coalition slightly dierent. In
their model a strategy prole x =( x 1;:::;x n) induces a cooperation structure BM(x)=
f B 1;:::;B mgwhere player i ends up in coalition xi if and only if xj = xi for all j 2 xi,
i.e., all players in the coalition prefered by player i prefer that coalition. If xj 6= xi for
some j 2 xi player i ends up isolated. The formulation of Meca-Martinez et al. (1998)
implies that a player ends up either isolated or in the coalition that he chose. In our
formulation he can also end up in a subset of the coalition that he chose. For notational
convenience we dene for all T  N and all xT 2
Q
i2T Xi, BM(xT) as the partition of T
where player i is in partition element xi if xi  T and xj = xi for all j 2 xi.O t h e r w i s e ,
player i ends up isolated.
The dierence between the two models of coalition structure formation is illustrated
in the following example.
Example 3.1 Let (N;v) be a 3-person cooperative game and γ some allocation rule
for cooperative games with coalition structures. Consider Γ(N;v;γ) and assume the
players have chosen the following strategies: x1 = N, x2 = N,a n dx 3=f 2 ; 3 g .T h e n
B ( x )=ff1;2g;f3gg since x1 = x2 6= x3. However, in the model of Meca-Martinez et
al. (1998) the resulting coalition structure is BM(x)=ff1g;f2g;f3gg since 3 2 x1 = x2
and x3 6= x1 = x2. Note that in the model of Meca-Martinez et al. (1998) player 3 can10
inﬂuence whether players 1 and 2 end up in the same partition element. Player 3 does
not have this inﬂuence in our model Γ(N;v;γ).
We will refer to the model of Meca-Martinez et al. (1998) with underlying cooperative
game (N;v) and allocation rule γ by ΓM(N;v;γ). The distinction between the model
of Meca-Martinez et al. (1998) and our model is exactly the same as the distinction
between models γ and  of Hart and Kurz (1983). In fact, the only dierence between
model γ of Hart and Kurz (1983) and the model of Meca-Martinez et al. (1998) is that
they analyze dierent allocation rules. The dierence between model  of Hart and Kurz
(1983) and our model is of a similar nature.
We will show that the results of Meca-Martinez et al. (1998) also hold for our model.
The allocation rules they study have the property that in a game with coalition structure
(N;v;B) the payo for player i 2 B 2Bdepends only on (v(S))SB. We will call such an
allocation rule a component restricted allocation rule.2 Consider the following properties
for a component restricted allocation rule γ:
Weak Monotonicity (WM) For all cooperative games with coalition structures
(N;v;B)a n d( N;w;B)i th o l d sf o ra l lB2Bthat if
v(S [f i g )−v( S)w( S[f i g )−w( S) for all i 2 B and all S  Bnfig
then γi(N;v;B)  γi(N;w;B) for all i 2 B.
Dummy Out (DO) For all cooperative games (N;v) and every partition B =
fB1;:::;B mg of N it holds for every k 2f 1 ;:::;mg and every i 2 Bk which
is a dummy player in the game (Bk;v jB k)t h a t
γ ( N;v;B)=γ ( N;v;B−i ) :
The following lemma corresponds to lemma 1 of Meca-Martinez et al. (1998).
Lemma 3.1 Let (N;v) be a convex game and γ a component restricted allocation
rule satisfying Weak Monotonicity and Dummy Out. Then for every partition B =
fB1;:::;B mgof N,e v e r yk2f 1 ;:::;mg, and every S  Bk it holds that for all i 2 S
γi(N;v;B)  γi(N;v;fB1;:::;B k−1;S;fjg j2B knS;B k+1;:::;B mg):
2Meca-Martinez et al. (1998) simply look at the game (B;vjB) and allocation rules for cooperative
games. This corresponds to restricting to component restricted allocation rules. We have changed the
properties accordingly.11
Proof: Let B = fB1;:::;B mg2 N,k2f 1 ;:::;mg,a n dl e tSB k. Dene
v






v( fig) for all T  N:
Now, since v is convex,
v(T [f i g )−v( T)v
S( T[f i g )−v
S( T)=^ v
S( T[f i g )−^ v
S( T)( 5 )
for all i 2 S and all T  Bknfig. Also, for all i 2 BknS and all T  Bknfig,
v(T [f i g )−v( T)v( f i g )=^ v
S( T[f i g )−^ v
S( T) : (6)
We conclude from (5) and (6) that
v(T [f i g )−v( T)^ v
S( T[f i g )−^ v
S( T)
for all i 2 Bk and all T  Bknfig. Then, since γ is a component restricted allocation
rule that satises (WM), it follows that γi(N;v;B)  γi(N;^ vS;B) for all i 2 Bk.N o t e
that for all j 2 BknS, j is a dummy player in (N;^ vS). Hence, j is a dummy player
in (T;^ vS
jT) for all T  N with j 2 T. Specically, j is a dummy player in (T;^ vS
jT)f o r
all T = S [ U, U  BknS with j 2 U. By repeated application of (DO) for all j 2
BknS it follows that γi(N;^ vS;B)=γ i( N;^ vS;fB1;:::;B k−1;S;fjg j2B knS;B k+1;:::;B mg)
for all i 2 S.N o w , s i n c e ( ^ v S ) j S= v j Sand γ is a component restricted al-
location rule, it follows that γi(N;^ vS;fB1;:::;B k−1;S;fjg j2B knS;B k+1;:::;B mg)=
γ i ( N;v;fB1;:::;B k−1;S;fjg j2B knS;B k+1;:::;B mg) for all i 2 S.
We conclude that γi(N;v;B)  γi(N;v;fB1;:::;B k−1;S;fjg j2B knS;B k+1;:::;B mg)
for all i 2 S.
2
It is now straightforward to show that theorems 1 and 2 of Meca-Martinez et al. (1998)
also hold for our model. Recall that x 2 X is a strong Nash equilibriumof Γ(γ)i ft h e r ei s
no coalition T  N and strategy prole ^ xT such that f
γ
i (^ xT;x NnT)f
γ
i (x) for all i 2 T,
with the inequality being strict for at least one player i 2 T. We denote the set of strong
Nash equilibria by SNE(Γ(γ)). Furthermore, we dene the set of coalition structures
that result according to strong Nash equilibria (strong Nash equilibrium partitions):
SNEP(Γ(γ)) := fB 2 
N j9 x2SNE(Γ(γ)) : B(x)=Bg:
The following theorem corresponds to theorems 1 and 2 in Meca-Martinez et al.
(1998).12
Theorem 3.1 Let (N;v) be a convex game and γ a component restricted allocation
rule satisfying (WM) and (DO). Then fNg2SNEP(Γ(γ)) and for all B2SNEP(Γ(γ))
it holds that γ(N;v;B)=γ ( N;v;fNg).
Proof: Let x 2 X be such that γ(N;v;B(x)) = γ(N;v;fNg). Let t 2 X, i 2 N,a n d
B2B ( t )w i t hi2B .S i n c eγis a component restricted allocation rule it follows that
γi(N;v;B(t)) = γi(N;v;fB;fjgj2NnBg)  γi(N;v;fNg)=γ i( N;v;B(x)); (7)
where the inequality follows by lemma 3.1. We conclude that x 2 SNE(Γ(γ)).
Let x 2 X be such that γ(N;v;B(x)) 6= γ(N;v;fNg). By (7) it follows that for all
i 2 N it holds that γi(N;v;B(x))  γi(N;v;fNg). Hence, the deviation to ti = N for all
i 2 N weakly improves the payo for all players with a strict improvement for at least
one player. So, x 62 SNE(Γ(γ)).
This completes the proof.
2
Note that in fact we prove a somewhat stronger result: B2SNEP(Γ(γ)) if only if
γ(N;v;B)=γ ( N;v;fNg). A similar strengthening is possible in the original model of
Meca-Martinez et al. (1998).
4 Potential games
In this section we study under what conditions on the allocation rule the two models
of coalition formation result in a potential game. We will show that under an eciency
requirement our model of coalition formation is a potential game if and only if the value
of Aumann and Dr eze (1974) is used as an allocation rule, whereas the original model
of Meca-Martinez et al. (1998) is a potential game if and only if an allocation rule that
equally divides the gains over the sum of stand-alone values is used. Furthermore, we
describe for the model of coalition formation of Meca-Martinez et al. (1998) the potential
maximizing strategy proles.
Firstly, we study Γ(N;v;γ), the model of coalition formation with the less stringent
formation rule. We show that the value of Aumann and Dr eze (1974) is the unique
component ecient allocation rule that results in a coalition formation game that is a
potential game. To accomplish this, we need two lemma's.
Lemma 4.1 Let γ be a component ecient allocation rule. Let (N;v) be a cooperative
game. If the associated coalition formation game Γ(N;v;γ) is a potential game then for13
all B2 N,a l lB2B ,a n da l li;j 2 B it holds that
γi(B)− γi(B−j )=γ j( B )−γ j( B−i ) : (8)
Proof: Let P be a potential for Γ(N;v;γ). Let B2 N,B2B ,a n di;j 2 B.L e t
x be a strategy prole that results in partition B, i.e., B(x)=B . Dene ti = fig and
tj = fjg.T h e n
0=P ( x ) − P ( x − i ;t i)+P( x − i;t i)−P(x −ij;t i;t j)
+P(x −ij;t i;t j)−P(x −j;t j)+P( x − j;t j)−P(x)
=( γ i ( B ) − γ i ( B−i )) + (γj(B−i )−γ j( B−j−i ))
+(γi(B−j−i )−γ i( B−j)) + (γj(B−j)−γ j( B))
= γi(B) − v(fig)+γ j( B−i )−v( f jg )+v( f i g )−γ i( B−j)+v( f jg )−γ j( B)
= γ i( B)−γ i( B−j)−γ j( B)+γ j( B−i ) ; (9)
where the second equality follows by denition of a potential and the third equality
follows since γi(B−i )=γ i( B−i−j )=v ( f i g ) by component eciency. Equation (9)
implies equation (8). This completes the proof.
2
In the following lemma we show that if the value of Aumann and Dr eze (1974) is
applied as an allocation rule then the coalition formation game is a potential game.
Lemma 4.2 Let (N;v) be a cooperative game. The coalition formation game
Γ(N;v;AD) is a potential game.





Then (N;vx)x2X 2G N;X since vx(R) depends only on xR. Furthermore, (N;vx)=
 AD(N;v;B(x)) for all x 2 X. This follows directly by noting that AD can be found
by computing the Shapley value for the subgames restricted to the partition elements.
Now, theorem 2.2 completes the proof.
2
Combining the lemmas above we can prove that the value of Aumann and Dr eze
(1974) is the unique allocation rule that results in a potential game.14
Theorem 4.1 Let (N;v) be a cooperative game. Let γ be a component ecient allo-
cation rule. The coalition formation game Γ(N;v;γ) is a potential game if and only if γ
coincides with the value of Aumann and Dr eze (1974) for all partitions of N.
Proof: Suppose that the coalition formation game Γ(γ) is a potential game. Lemma
4.1 implies that for all B2 N,a l lB2B ,a n da l li;j 2 B equation (8) holds. It can
then be shown analogously to the proof of theorem 2.1 that γ coincides with the value
of Aumann and Dr eze (1974) for all partitions of N.3
The reverse statement follows by lemma 4.2.
2
The following example shows that the value of Aumann and Dr eze (1974) does not
result in a potential game in the model of Meca-Martinez et al. (1998).
Example 4.1 C o n s i d e rt h eT U - g a m e( N;v)w i t hN=f 1 ;2 ;3 gand
v(S)=
8
> > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > :
0i f j S j1;
40 if S = f1;2g;
50 if S = f1;3g;
60 if S = f2;3g;
72 if S = N:
(10)
Suppose that player 3 plays strategy x3 = f1;2;3g. Then part of the payo-matrix of
ΓM(N;v;AD) is given below.
x2 = f2;3g t2 = f1;2;3g
x1 = f1;3g (0,0,0) (0,0,0)
t1 = f1;2;3g (0,0,0) (19,24,29)
If ΓM(N;v;AD) is a potential game it should hold that there exists a potential P such
that
0=P ( x ) − P ( t 1 ;x 2;x 3)+P( t 1;x 2;x 3)−P(t 1;t 2;x 3)





















3It only follows that γ satises (CRBC) for the game (N;v). Therefore, we cannot use theorem 2.1
directly, since this requires (CRBC) for all cooperative games. Careful reading of the proof, however,




1 (BM(t1;t 2;x 3)) − AD





2 (BM(x1;t 2;x 3)) − AD
2 (BM(x))

=( 0 − 0) + (0 − 24) + (19 − 0) + (0 − 0)
6=0 ; (11)
where the second equality follows by denition (2) of a potential and the third equality
by the payos above. We conclude that ΓM(N;v;AD) is not a potential game.
In the following theorem we show that the model of Meca-Martinez et al. (1998) is a
potential game if and only if every coalition divides the surplus of the coalition over the
sum of stand-alone values equally among the players in this coalition.
Theorem 4.2 Let (N;v) be a cooperative game. Let γ be a component ecient allo-
cation rule. The coalition formation game ΓM(N;v;γ) is a potential game if and only if





Proof: First we show the only-if-part. Assume that ΓM(N;v;γ) is a potential game
with associated potential P. We will show that for all B2 N,a l lB2B ,a n da l li2B
it holds that






Obviously, by component eciency (12) holds for all B2 N,a l lB2Bwith jBj =1 ,
and i 2 B.L e tp2. We will show that (12) holds for all B2 N,a l lBwith jBj = p,
and all i 2 B.L e t B2 N and B 2Bsuch that jBj = p.L e t x 2 Xbe a strategy
prole that results in partition B, i.e., BM(x)=B .L e ti;j 2 B and dene ti = fig and
tj = fjg.T h e n
0=P ( x ) − P ( x − i ;t i)+P( x − i;t i)−P(x −ij;t i;t j)+P( x − ij;t i;t j)−P(x −j;t j)
+P(x −j;t j)−P(x)
=( γ i ( B ) − v ( f i g )) + (v(fjg)− v(fjg)) + (v(fig)− v(fig))
+(v(fjg) − γj(B)): (13)
The second equality follows by denition of a potential P. We conclude that γi(B) −
v(fig)=γ j ( B ) −v ( f j g ). Since i and j were chosen arbitrarily in B it follows by
component eciency that for all i 2 B






This completes the only-if-part.
It remains to show the if-part. Let γ be the allocation rule determined by





; for all B2
N; all B 2B ;and all i 2 B:








































So, the value of coalition T  N in the game corresponding to strategy prole x 2 X
depends only on the strategies of the players in coalition T and hence,
f(N;vx)gx2X 2G N;X:
Furthermore, for all x 2 X





for all B 2B M( x )a n da l li2B:
By theorem 2.2 it follows that ΓM(N;v;γ) is a potential game.
This completes the if-part.
2
For a zero-normalized game this impliesthat the model of Meca-Martinez et al. (1998)
is a potential game if and only if the value of each partition element is divided equally
among its members. Since for zero-normalized games the model of Meca-Martinez et al.
(1998) with this allocation rule coincides with the model of coalition formation of Von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), we conclude that the model of Von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1944) is a potential game if the underlying game is zero-normalized. It can





for all x 2 X. Analyzing this associated potential function then implies that according












The potential maximizer selects a coalition structure that maximizes the sum over all
partition elements of the payos each player in a partition element receives.17
5 Potential Maximizers
In this section we will consider potential maximizing strategies in the coalition formation
game Γ(N;v;AD)w i t h( N;v) a superadditive underlying cooperative game. We will
show that the cooperation structure with all players in one component results from a
potential maximizing strategy prole. Subsequently, we will show that every potential
maximizing strategy prole results in a cooperation structure that is payo equivalent
to this structure.
Before we can show that cooperation structure fNg results from a potential maximiz-
ing strategy prole we need some results on cooperative HM-potential games, cf. Hart
and Mas-Colell (1989).
Theorem 5.1 Let (N;v) be a superadditive game. Then the associated HM-potential
game (N;PHM) is also superadditive.












5 for all S  N; S 6= ;: (14)





The proof will be by induction to the number of elements in S[T. Obviously, (15) holds
for all S, T with jS [ Tj =0 ,s i n c eP HM(;)=0 .L e tp1. Assume that (15) holds for
all S, T with jS [Tjp−1. We will show that (15) holds for all S, T with jS [Tj = p.




j S [ T j
2






















































where the inequality follows from superadditivity of (N;v) and the induction hypothesis.
The third equality follows by equation (14). This completes the proof.
2
The following lemma shows that a potential for Γ(AD) can be given in terms of the
HM-potential game associated with the underlying cooperative game.






(N;v)(B) for all x 2 X (17)
is a potential for the coalition formation game Γ(N;v;AD).
Proof: We have to show that P is a potential. Therefore, consider x 2 X, i 2 N
and ui 2 Xi with xi 6= ui. It suces to check that P(x) − P(x−i;u i)= AD
i (B(x)) −
AD
i (B(x−i;u i)). Denote by B
1 and B
2 the partition elements player i belongs to ac-




2nfig2B ( x )o rB 
2nfig = ;,a n dB 
1nfig2B ( x − i ;u i)o rB 
1nfig = ; it holds
that4























































































where the third equality holds since B(x)nfB
1;B
2nfigg = B(x−i;u i)nfB
2;B
1nfigg.
This completes the proof.
2
For every player i 2 N we denote  xi = N. Using the results above we can prove that
the strategy prole  x =(  x i) i 2 N is a potential maximizing strategy prole.






Theorem 5.2 Let (N;v) be a superadditive game and Γ(AD) the associated coalition
formation game with potential P.T h e n x2argmax P.





HM(B) for all x 2 X:





Monderer and Shapley (1996) show that the set of potential maximizing strategy proles
does not depend on the choice of a particular potential. Hence,  x 2 argmax P 0 for every
potential P0.
This completes the proof.
2
Before we can show that every potential maximizing strategy prole results in the
same payos as the strategy prole resulting in the unique component N, we need
another lemma.
Lemma 5.2 Let (N;v) be a superadditive game. Then for all S  N and all T  NnS
it holds that
PHM(S[T)=PHM(S)+PHM(T) )v(U)=v ( S\U)+v(T\U)8US[T: (18)
Proof: First note that it follows from theorem 5.1 that (N;PHM) is superadditive. We
proceed by induction to the number of elements in S [T. Obviously, if jS [Tj =0t h e n
(18) holds. Let p  1. Suppose that (18) holds for all S, T with jS [ Tjp−1. We
will show that (18) holds for all S, T with jS [ Tj = p.L e tSNand T  NnS with
jS [ Tj = p. Suppose P HM(S[T)=P HM(S)+PHM(T). Then since the inequality in
equation (16) must hold with equality it follows that




HM(T) 8k 2S; (20)
P HM((S [ T)nfkg)=P
HM(S)+P
HM(Tnfkg) 8k 2 T: (21)
From the induction hypothesis and equations (20) and (21) it follows that for all k 2 S[T
v(U)=v ( S\U)+v( T\U)8 U( S[T) nfkg: (22)20
Combining equations (19) and (22) completes the proof.
2
Using the lemma above we can prove the following theorem.
Theorem 5.3 Let (N;v) be a superadditive game and Γ(AD) the associated coalition
formation game with potential P.L e tx2argmax P.T h e n AD(B(x)) = AD(fNg).
Proof: Denote B(x)=( B 1 ;:::;B m). If Γ(AD) is a potential game then a potential
is given by equation (17). Since the set of potential maximizing strategy proles is
independent of the specic potential, we can assume without loss of generality that P is














P HM(Bk)=P( x ) ; (23)
where the equalities follow by lemma 5.1 and the inequalities follow by theorem 5.1.
Since x 2 argmax P all inequalities hold with equality.
Let U  N then, using lemma 5.2, the following equalities are implied by the corre-
sponding equalities in equation (23).
v(U)=v ( U \ ( [ m − 1
k =1 Bk)) + v(U \ Bm)







v(U \ Bk): (24)




v(B \ U): (25)
Equation (25) implies that AD(B(x)) = AD(fNg). This completes the proof.
2
In the following example we will show that not every strategy prole that results in
the same payos as the full cooperation structure is potential maximizing.21




> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
0i f j S j1;
2i f j S j =2 ;
3i f j S j =3 ;
4i f S = N:
(26)
Then some straightforward calculations show that AD
i (fNg) = 1 for all i 2 N and
AD
i ((f1;2g;f3;4g)) = 1 for all i 2 N.S i n c e v=
P
S : j S j =2 2uS −
P
S:jSj=3 3uS +4 u N it








> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
0i f j S j1;
1i f j S j =2 ;
2i f j S j =3 ;
3i f S = N:
(27)
Hence, PHM(N) >P HM(f1;2g)+P HM(f3;4g). Then by lemma 5.1 it follows that
P( x) >P ( x ), with x =( f 1 ; 2 g ; f 1 ; 2 g ; f 3 ; 4 g ; f 3 ; 4 g ), showing that not every strategy
prole that results in the same payos as the full cooperation structure maximizes the
potential function.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied two models of coalition formation. The models dier only
in the formation rule. We showed that the results of Meca-Martinez et al. (1998) also
hold for our model. These results deal with sucient conditions on an allocation rule to
ensure that the grand coalition results from a strong Nash equilibrium when the original
TU-game is convex.
Subsequently, we showed that under an eciency requirement, our model of coalition
formation is a potential game if and only if the value of Aumann and Dr eze (1974) is used
as an allocation rule. The model of coalition formation of Meca-Martinez et al. (1998)
is a potential game if and only if an allocation rule that equally divides the surplus over
the sum of stand-alone values is used.
Finally, we showed that if the underlying cooperative game is superadditive then the
potential maximizer in our model with the value of Aumann and Dr eze (1974) used as
an allocation rule points towards the formation of the grand coalition. This result is in
line with results of Qin (1996) and Slikker et al. (1999) who deal with link formation22
and conference formation respectively. However, all these results are sensitive to the
superadditivity assumption and the equilibrium renement chosen.
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